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INVESTIGATORY POWER OF AN
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The scope of an agency's investigatory power is wholly dependent upon
the authority conferred on it by Congress. In several early cases the breadth
of the investigatory delegation by Congress was seriously questioned on con-
stitutional grounds,' but the Court never struck down these delegations.
In these early cases, the Court seemed to feel that unbridled allowance of
administrative investigatory power would come dangerously close to violat-
ing the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures. For this reason the statutes conferring the power to investigate
were narrowly construed.
Harriman v. ICC2 offers a good example of this judicial attitude. That
case dealt with an interpretation of section 12 of the Interstate Commerce
Act,3 which conferred general investigatory and subpoena power on the
Commission to be used to require testimony of witnesses "for purposes of
this Act." 4 The Court held that the Commission's primary purpose was to
enforce the regulations enacted by Congress.5 Thus, the Commission could
1 See, e.g., Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1935); FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S.
298 (1924); Smith v. ICC, 245 U.S. 33 (1917); Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407 (1908); ICC
v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
2 211 U.S. 407 (1908). Previously, in ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1908), the Court
upheld the statutory procedure requiring the Commission to obtain judicial enforcement
of its subpoenas, against a claim that federal courts lacked constitutional power to hear
such petitions on the ground that they did not present a "case or controversy" as required
by Article III of the United States Constitution. In that case the Court, by way of dictum,
also approved of the constitutionality of congressional delegations of investigatory powers
to administrative agencies.
In iCC v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25 (1904), the constitutional questions were directly placed
in issue. The Court held that the investigation there involved did not violate the fourth
and fifth amendments, and thereby established the constitutionality of the administrative
power of investigation.
3 24 Stat. 379 (1887). Section 12 was later amended (26 Stat. 743 (1891)). It was in this
amended form that it was presented to the Court.
4 At this time § 11 read, in pertinent part, as follows:
• . . the Commission hereby created shall have authority to inquire into the
management of the business of all common carriers subject to the provisions of
act, and shall keep itself informed as to the manner and method in which the
same is conducted, and shall have the right to obtain from such common carriers
full and complete information necessary to enable the Commission to perform
the duties and carry out the objects for which it was created; . . .and for pur-
poses of this act the Commission shall have power to require by subpoena, the
attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of all books, papers,
tariffs, contracts, agreements, and documents relating to any matter under
investigation.
Such attendance of witnesses, and the production of such documentary evi-
dence may be required from any place in the United States, at any designated
place of hearing.
Current statutory provisions relating to the invesitgatory power of the ICC can be found
at 49 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13 & 13a (1964).
5 In so holding, the Court specifically rejected the contention that one of the main
purposes of the Commission was to use the investigatory power as a means of gathering
data pursuant to recommending needed legislation.
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only investigate pursuant to the issuance of a complaint. Since the case
involved an industry-wide investigation which was not related to any specific
breach of the law, the Commission was without power to compel testimony.6
However, the holding of the Harriman case was not to last long. In
Smith v. ICC,7 the Court rejected appellant's argument that the investi-
gatory power could only be exercised pursuant to an enforcement proceed-
ing, and could not be so exercised in a special investigation authorized by
resolution of the Senate.8 In so doing the Court apparently envisioned a
broad investigatory power for the Commission. Justice McKenna stated:
[T]he investigating and supervising powers of the Commission
extend to all of the activities of carriers and to all sums expended
by them which could affect in any way their benefit or burden as
agents of the public ... and it is not far from true-it may be it is
entirely true . . .- that there can be nothing private or confiden-
tial in the activities and expenditures of a carrier engaged in inter-
state commerce.9
Whatever liberalization was achieved by the Smith case was soon dis-
pelled in FTC v. American Tobacco Co.10 As in Smith, this case too involved
an industry-wide investigation initiated at the request of the Senate."
The respondent had refused a Commission order to produce its corporate
records for the year 1921, and the Distgict Court had denied the Commis-
sion's petition for enforcement. While Justice Holmes did not deny the
constitutionality of administrative investigatory power, he did exhibit a
strong fear that the exercise of such power could easily result in unreason-
able searches and seizures.
Anyone who respects the spirit as well as the letter of the
Fourth Amendment would be loathe to believe that Congress in-
tended to authorize one of its subordinate agencies to sweep all
traditions into the fire . . . , and to direct fishing expeditions into
private papers on the possibility that they may disclose evidence of
a crime.12
6 This decision is somewhat surprising in view of the dictum in ICC v. Brimson, 154
U.S. 447 (1894), to wit:
All must recognize the fact that the full information necessary as a basis of
intelligent legislation by Congress from time to time upon the subject of inter-
state commerce cannot be obtained . . . otherwise than through the instrumentality
of an administrative body, representing the whole country, always watchful of
the general interests, and charged with the duty . . . of obtaining the required
information. ...
7 245 U.S. 33 (1917).
8 The resolution requested that the ICC investigation determine whether appellant's
railroad was engaging in any conspiracies that might tend to lessen competition. 50
Cong. Rec. 5864 (1913). The information demanded of appellant in this case related to
political contributions made by his railroad. The Court held that this information ex-
ceeded that requested by the Senate, and so decided the case on the basis of the Com-
mission's general statutory authority.
9 Smith v. ICC, 245 U.S. 33, 42-43 (1917).
10 264 U.S. 298 (1924).
11 The Senate resolution directed the Commission to investigate "the tobacco
situation" with reference to pricing policies. 61 Cong. Rec. 4753 (1921).
12 FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305-306 (1924).
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The Court distinguished the Smith case on the ground that that case in-
volved a railroad, which, being a public utility, is subject to closer govern-
mental scrutiny.
Justice Holmes then preserved the constitutionality of the statute by
reading into it a requirement that the records required must be material.
This apparently imposed on administrative investigations the standard of
probable cause required by the fourth amendment. He concluded by stat-
ing: "We cannot attribute to Congress an intent to defy the Fourth Amend-
ment or even to come so near to doing so as to raise a serious question of
constitutional law."'1
The American Tobacco case imposed serious restrictions on adminis-
trative fact finding powers. The decision undoubtedly reflects a suspicion
of the relatively new administrative "branch," and a desire to keep it under
close judicial surveillance.
It is interesting to note that in both the Harriman and the American
Tobacco cases, the investigations were on an industry wide basis and were
undertaken at the insistence of the Senate. In both of these cases the Court
indicated, explicitly in Harriman, and implicitly in American Tobacco,
that the investigatory power could only be constitutionally exercised in
connection with a complaint proceeding. This would seem to reflect a
general disapproval of legislative-type investigations which dates back to
Kilbourn v. Thompson.14 Dicta in that case cast serious doubt on the
power of either house of Congress to conduct prelegislative investigations.
The Harriman and American Tobacco cases seem to represent an extension
of this doubt to similar type investigations conducted by the administrative
creations of Congress.
Indications of a change in judicial attitude toward administrative in-
vestigations appeared not too long after the Court unequivocally recognized
the investigatory power of Congress in McGrain v. Daugherty15 and Sinclair
v. United States,16 and thereby overruled whatever irmuendo was created by
Kilbourn v. Thompson. For example, certiorari was denied in Bartlett Frazier
Co. v. Hyde,17 in which the Circuit Court of Appeals had approved an
inquiry into the appellant's business records. The court said:
The (Fourth) Amendment . .. cannot be applied to regulations
which require reports and disclosures in respect to a business which
is affected with a public interest, so far as such disclosures may be
reasonably necessary for the due protection of the public.' 8
i3 Id. at 307.
14 103 U.S. 168 (1880). The Court held that a subpoena issued by the House of Rep-
resentatives pursuant to an investigation into the affairs of Jay Cooke & Co. was invalid
as being an exercise of judicial power.
15 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
16 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
17 65 F.2d 350 (7th Cir.); cert. denied 290 U.S. 654 (1933).
18 Id. at 351-352.
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Involved in the Bartlett case was a disclosure requirement applicable to
grain futures brokers. The significance of the case is that it indicated that
broader visitation powers would be permitted when dealing with an indus-
try characterized as being "affected with a public interest."
Despite the Bartlett case, the Court lapsed back into its former attitude
in Jones v. SEC, 19 in which it reversed a lower court order enforcing a
subpoena issued to the petitioner. In that case, the petitioner had filed a
registration statement which the Commission challenged as being incom-
plete and untrue. He then withdrew his registration statement and refused
agency demands to produce certain of his records. Thereupon, the Com-
mission issued its subpoena. The Court rested its decision partially on the
ground that further pursuit of information after the registration statement
had been withdrawn would constitute the kind of "fishing expedition"
decried in FTC v. American Tobacco Co. and would contradict the philos-
ophy of the fourth and fifth amendments in a manner reminiscent of the
abuses of the Star Chamber. All of this brought forth a strong dissent from
Justice Cardozo, 20 in which he said:
Appeal is vaguely made to some constitutional immunity,
whether express or implied, is not stated with distinctness .... The
argument for immunity lays hold of strange analogies. A Commis-
sion which is without coercive powers, which cannot arrest or
amerce or imprison though a crime has been uncovered, or even
punish for contempt, but can only inquire and report, the pro-
priety of every question in the course of the inquiry being subject
to the supervision of the ordinary courts of justice, is likened with
denunciatory fervor to the Star Chamber of the Stuarts. Historians
may find hyperbole in the sanguinory simile.
The Rule now assailed was wisely conceived and lawfully
adopted to foil the plans of knaves intent upon obscuring or sup-
pressing the knowledge of their knavery. 21
After taking this brief detour, the Court continued in its former direc-
tion. It denied certiorari in Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,2 2 in which
the Circuit Court of Appeals held that an agency may inspect books and
records, regardless of whether there had been any pre-existing probable
cause for believing that there had been a violation of the law.2 While it
was to become clearer later, it was suggested at the time that the Fleming
case signalled the end to whatever vitality remained in the American
Tobacco Co. case.2 4
A very significant step in the development of the administrative in-
19 See Davis, The Administrative Power of Investigation, 56 Yale L.J., 1111, 1113
(1947); Note, Minn. L. Rev. 261, 265 (1944).
20 Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1935).
21 Id. at 32-3.
22 114 F.2d 384 (7th Cir.); cert. denied 311 U.S. 690 (1940).
23 Id. at 390.
24 See, Davis, The Administrative Power of Investigation, 56 Yale L.J., 1111, 1113
(1947); Note, Minn. L. Rev. 261, 265 (1944).
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vestigatory power came when the Court announced its decision in Endicott
Johnson Corp. v. Perkins.25 While that case did not resolve any of the still
plaguing constitutional issues, it contributed the important ruling that the
agency need not demonstrate that the information demanded tended to
prove a violation of the substantive act administered by it. The Court
reasoned that the issue of whether a person came within the coverage of
the Act was in itself a proper matter for investigation. The Administrator,
then, could obtain enforcement of his subpoenas provided they were not
"plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose of the Secretary." 26
Any constitutional doubts were finally dispelled in Oklahoma Press
Publishing Co. v. Walling.27 That case involved a subpoena duces tecum
issued by the Administrator of the Fair Labor Standards Act 2s calling for
"all of your books, papers, and documents showing the hours worked by,
and wages paid to, each of your employees between October 29, 1938 and
the date hereof (Nov. 3, 1943) .... -29 The Court extensively reviewed the
argument that administrative investigations involved an unreasonable search
and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment, and concluded that such
arguments were groundless. It expressly rejected the contention that "the
subpoena power is equivalent to a search and seizure and to be constitu-
tional it must be a reasonable exercise of power,"' 0 while approving the
language in Justice Cardozo's dissent in Jones v. SEC set out above.31 The
Court concluded by saying that the requirements of the fourth amendment
are met, and the dangers inherent in the general warrant or writ of as-
sistance are prevented, if:
the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose, within the
power of Congress to command .... The requirement of "probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation" . . . is satisfied, in . . . an
order for production, by the Court's determination that the investi-
gation is authorized by Congress, is for a purpose Congress can
order, and the documents sought are relevant to the inquiry.
Beyond this the requirement of reasonableness comes down to
specification of the documents to be produced adequate, but not
excessive, for the purposes of the relevant inquiry. 32
The holding in Oklahoma Press was buttressed by the Court's decision
in United States v. Morton Salt Co., 33 involving an order issued by the FTC
requiring production of certain records and documents for the purpose of
25 317 U.S. 501 (1943). The case involved an interpretation of the Walsh-Healey Act,
41 U.S.C. 35-45 (1964), under which the Secretary of Labor is authorized to estabish
minimum wages for workers in plants having government contracts in excess of $10,000.
26 Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943).
27 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
28 29 U.S.C. § 209 &c 211(a) (1964).
29 Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 147 F.2d 658, 659 (10th Cir. 1945).
30 The quote was taken from Lasson, History and Development of the Fourth
Amendment 137 (1937).
31 The approved language is set out in the text accompanying note 21, supra.
32 Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946).
33 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
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showing compliance with a cease and desist order issued against respondent
by the Commission. The respondent raised the fourth amendment issue
which the Court easily disposed of by likening the Commission's inquisi-
torial powers to those of a Grand Jury "which can investigate merely on
suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants as-
surance that it is not."'3 4 The Court then laid down its often quoted test of
administrative subpoena validity:
It is sufficient if the inquiry is within the authority of the agency,
the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is
reasonably relevant.3 5
STATE OF THE LAW TODAY
It is common today to find statements suggesting a virtually unchecked
administrative power of inquiry.3 6 Such statements, though generally true,
are oversimplifications; it would be error to believe that the permissiveness
evidenced in cases like Morton Salt and Oklahoma Press are equally ap-
plicable to investigations by all the administrative agencies. In fact, the
Court is primarily interested in balancing the interests of the respective
parties and arriving at a solution that appears best in the particular case.
Thus, in the most common type of case, where the agency is delving into
corporate records, a court must weigh the corporation's interest in privacy
against the agency's interest in implementing the public policy of free and
open competition as a means of achieving the most efficient use and alloca-
tion of resources. 37 In such cases, the courts have determined that the public
interest weighs more heavily and have generally permitted very penetrating
investigations.
This approach is also evident in non-economic areas. Witness, for
example, Frank v. Maryland,3 in which a Baltimore city ordinance au-
34 Id. at 642-43.
35 Id. at 652.
36 See, e.g., 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 3.06 & 3.14 (1958); Benton, Ad-
ministrative Subpoena Enforcement, 41 Texas L. Rev. 874 (1963); Rogge, Inquisitions by
Officials; A Study of Due Process Requirements in Administrative Investigation-I, 47
Minn. L. Rev. 939 (1963).
An illustration of this view can be found in Benton, supra at 882:
The cases dealing with legislative use of compulsory processes within the last two
decades have dealt mainly with due process rights and privileges of the indi-
viduals subpoenaed. The existence of the power itself is taken for granted.
The restrictive philosophy of 1881 is gone ...
37 Some slight hint of this balancing approach was evident in the Morton Salt case.
The Court there rested its decision in part on the ground that the Government permitted
the corporation the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, and this privilege
carried with it an enhanced measure of regulation. 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
However, this characterization of interstate commerce as being a privilege begs the
essential question of whether it is a privilege or a right. This privilege-right dichotomy
is well-known in administrative law in such areas as right to hearing and judicial review,
and is now well recognized as being more of a conclusion than a substantive test. In back
of this conclusion is a judicial balancing of the relative interests of the parties.
38 359 U.S. 360 (1959). [Editor's Note-Subsequent to this issue going to press, Frank v.
Maryland, supra note 38 has been overruled by Camara v. Municipal Court of City & Co.
of San Francisco, - U.S. - , 82 Sup. Ct. 1727 (1967)].
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thorized health examiners to enter the home of any person to investigate
health violations where there is cause for suspicion of the existence of a
nuisance. The ordinance also provided for a fine to be imposed against any
person who refused to admit a health officer into his home. In this case the
Court was faced with the problem of having to balance the interests of the
individual in his privacy, against the community health interest. Noting
that the ordinance provided protection against the use of the power by
requiring the existence of cause for suspicion of the existence of the nui-
sance and by limiting the conduct of the investigations to daylight hours,
the Court upheld the ordinance against claims of violation of the fourth
and fourteenth amendments. Thus, the limitations placed on the use of
the power combined with a high public interest in community health
counterweigh the usually preferred right of individual privacy.
There does reach a point, however, when individual rights will so
strongly outweigh the public interest as to result in serious restrictions
being placed on the investigatory power. A good example can be found in
United States v. Minker.39 That case involved the interpretation of a pro-
vision of the Immigration and Naturalization Act 40 which conferred upon
immigration officers the power to require, by subpoena, the "attendance and
testimony of witnesses .... ,,41 The respondent in that case was a naturalized
U.S. citizen who had been served a subpoena in an effort by the agency to
determine whether good cause existed to institute denatuaralization pro-
ceedings against him. No constitutional issues were raised in the case, the
sole issue being whether a putative defendant in a denaturalization proceed-
ing could properly be considered a witness within the meaning of the
statute. If he could properly be considered a witness, then the issuance of
the subpoena was within the agency's investigatory power. Justice Frank-
furter recognized a "patent ambiguity" that existed in the statutory lan-
guage which made it possible to interpret the statute as applying to the
respondent. Yet, the Court refused to interpret "witnesses" as including
prospective defendants, stating:
In such a situation where there is doubt it must be resolved in the
citizen's favor. Especially must we be sensitive to the citizen's rights
where the proceeding is nonjudicial because of "(T)he difference
in security of judicial over administrative action .... Ng Fung Ho
v. White (295 U.S. 276) at page 285....
(C)ompulsory ex parte administrative examinations, untra-
melled by the safeguards of a public adversary judicial proceed-
ing, afford too ready opportunities for unhappy consequences to
prospective defendants in denaturalization suits. 42
39 350 U.S. 179 (1956).
40 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1964).
41 8 U.S.c. § 1225(a) (1964). (Emphasis added.)
42 United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 188 (1956).
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The Minker case is significant as pointing out the fallacy in concluding
that the administrative investigatory power is boundless. The power has
its limits, but these limits are not frequently reached in the ordinary course
of administrative investigation. Most of the investigations are conducted by
the so-called regulatory agencies which have been established to oversee
particular types of economic activity or particular segments of the economy.
As to those agencies, it may well be true that the investigatory power is
virtually unchecked. But it should not be concluded, by an examination of
cases involving those agencies, that the principles announced therein will
be equally applicable to the investigatory power of all agencies. This is
not to suggest that investigations conducted by some agencies are consti-
tutional, while those conducted by other agencies are not. It is only to sug-
gest that where the individual interest is high enough to overweigh the
public interest, the courts will be far less permissive, and will subject the
investigations to greater judicial scrutiny.43
NORMAN KALLEN
43 Another example of judicial reluctance to enforce administrative subpoenas when
stronger competing interests exist can be found in In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 309
F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1962). In that case the FTC had requested leave of court to inspect and
copy certain documents submitted to a grand jury impanelled in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. That jury had previously returned twenty indictments alleging violations
of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The court recognized the broad investigatory power of
the Commission, but chose to adhere to the policy of preserving the secrecy of grand
jury proceedings as provided for by Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
28 U.S.C. (1964). The court strictly construed Rule 6(e) even though, by its terms, access
to grand jury records was allowed "to the attorneys for the government for use in the
performance of their duties" and disclosure could be ordered by a court "preliminarily
to or in connection with a judicial proceeding." Thus, even though ambiguous statutory
language could have been construed to permit access by the FTC, the court apparently
considered the need for grand jury secrecy paramount to the needs of the Commission.
